Probability Weighting as Evolutionary Second-best by Herold, Florian & Netzer, Nick
  
 
 
Socioeconomic Institute 
Sozialökonomisches Institut 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 1005 
 
Probability Weighting as Evolutionary Second-best 
 
Florian Herold, Nick Netzer 
 
Revised version, January 2011  
 
 
Socioeconomic Institute 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper No. 1005 
 
Probability Weighting as Evolutionary Second-best 
 
 
 
 
 
Revised version, January 2011 
 
Author's address: Florian Herold 
 E-mail: f-herold@kellogg.northwestern.edu 
  
 Nick Netzer 
 E-mail: nick.netzer@soi.uzh.ch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Publisher  Sozialökonomisches Institut 
Bibliothek (Working Paper) 
Rämistrasse 71 
CH-8006 Zürich 
Phone: +41-44-634 21 37 
Fax: +41-44-634 49 82 
URL: www.soi.uzh.ch 
E-mail: soilib@soi.uzh.ch 
Probability Weighting as
Evolutionary Second-best∗
Florian Herold
Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Nick Netzer
University of Zurich
This Version: January 2011
Abstract
The economic concept of the second-best involves the idea that multiple simultane-
ous deviations from a hypothetical first-best optimummay be optimal once the first-best
itself can no longer be achieved, since one distortion may partially compensate for an-
other. Within an evolutionary framework, we translate this concept to behavior under
uncertainty. We argue that the two main components of prospect theory, the value
function and the probability weighting function, are complements in the second-best
sense. Previous work has shown that an adaptive S-shaped value function may be evo-
lutionary optimal if decision-making is subject to cognitive or perceptive constraints.
We show that distortions in the way probabilities are perceived can further enhance
fitness. The second-best optimum involves overweighting of small and underweight-
ing of large probabilities. Behavior as described by prospect theory might therefore
be evolution's second-best solution to the fitness maximization problem. We discuss
under which circumstance our model makes empirically testable predictions about the
relation between individuals' value and probability weighting functions.
Keywords: Probability Weighting, Prospect Theory, Evolution of Preferences.
JEL Classification: D01, D03, D81.
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evolutionary second-best.
1 Introduction
[W]e must as a second best, as people say, take the least of the evils;
and this will be done best in the way we describe.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Chapter 9.
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) introduced the concept of the second-best in economics, which
is now widespread. It compares the first-best solution to an optimization problem under
constraints that are in the nature of things (p. 12), such as technological constraints for
a problem of welfare maximization, to the second-best solution when additional constraints
are imposed on the same problem. The scope of such additional constraints ranges from
exogenously fixed taxes or tariffs (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956) to asymmetric information
in contract-theoretic applications (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). Lipsey and Lancaster's
most important finding is that if one of the Paretian [first-best] optimum conditions cannot
be fulfilled a second best optimum situation is achieved only by departing from all other
optimum conditions. (p. 12). For instance, once several countries have introduced tariffs, a
unilateral tariff reduction by a single country may well decrease overall welfare, even though
the hypothetical first-best involves no tariffs at all (Viner 1999). Here, within an evolutionary
framework, we aim at translating this concept to behavior under uncertainty.
As a starting point we observe that evolution can be interpreted as a process that max-
imizes a suitably defined notion of fitness (Maynard Smith 1978), by selecting those be-
havioral traits that are most conducive to reproduction. Much recent work has employed
this paradigm fruitfully in the study of human behavior and its foundation (see Robson
and Samuelson (2008) for an overview). With respect to behavior under uncertainty, for
instance, Robson (1996) has shown that the largest fitness can be achieved by expected
utility maximizing agents, whenever risk is idiosyncratic.1 This result has been derived in
a framework that could be described as first-best, where no constraint besides the natural
scarcity of resources has been imposed. Several other papers have considered additional
constraints. The contributions by Friedman (1989), Robson (2001), Rayo and Becker (2007)
and Netzer (2009) explicitly model cognitive or perceptive constraints of a decision-maker.
Within different frameworks they conclude that the use of an adaptive, possibly S-shaped
value function as postulated in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) is superior in
the presence of such constraints.2 In short, steepness of the function that evaluates payoffs is
helpful to prevent decision mistakes in these models, because it enables to distinguish even
1This is no longer the case with aggregate, i.e. correlated risk. See Cooper and Kaplan (1982), Robson
(1996), Bergstrom (1997), Curry (2001) and Robson and Samuelson (2009).
2See also Hamo and Heifetz (2002) for a model in which S-shaped utility evolves in a framework with
aggregate risk.
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alternatives that are very similar to each other. Hence a relatively large slope should be
allocated to regions where correct decisions matter most (the agent's reference point), which
explains the adaptive nature and the S-shape of the value function. The above papers all
assume that the decision-maker perceives probabilities correctly.
This assumption seems not justified. To the contrary, even if there is no constraint that
directly prevents the correct perception of probabilities, the general concept of the second-
best outlined above leads us to the conjecture that probabilities should not be perceived
correctly. We investigate the validity of this conjecture in a simple model where nature
offers randomly drawn prospects (lotteries) to an agent, who decides whether to accept or
reject. For instance, the choice whether or not to go hunting in a specific area, at a particular
time, is one such decision that humans were regularly confronted with during evolutionary
history. The eventual outcome of a hunt is stochastic, with varying, situation-dependent
probabilities. We now take the insights of the above discussed literature for granted and
assume that, to evaluate payoffs, the agent uses an adaptive and S-shaped, rather than a
fixed fitness-reflecting value function. Hence we do not model the underlying cognitive or
perceptive constraints explicitly, which adds to the clarity of our results. Importantly, we
also do not assume that constraints directly prevent the correct perception of probabilities;
correct perception would in principle be possible, so that any probability weighting that
emerges in our model is solely an optimal adaptation to the value function.
The basic model and our main results will be presented in Section 2, where we consider
simple prospects (with only one possible gain and one possible loss) and assume away loss
aversion. As a benchmark we first allow perceived probabilities to depend not only on true
probabilities but also on the associated payoffs, and we show that first-best behavior, i.e.
expected fitness/utility maximizing behavior can then be implemented despite the distortion
introduced by the value function. We then impose the restriction that probability weight-
ing has to be payoff-independent, in line with the usual descriptive theories for decisions
under risk. In that case, the first-best can no longer be achieved generically. Furthermore,
any solution to the fitness maximization problem involves overweighting of small and un-
derweighting of large probabilities. Intuitively, lotteries with an expected fitness close to
zero are especially prone to decision mistakes, and small probabilities go along with large
absolute payoffs in such lotteries. Large absolute payoffs are, in turn, relatively undervalued
by the S-shaped value function. To compensate, it becomes optimal to overweigh small and
underweigh large probabilities. We show that the optimal probability perception can be
implemented by reflective and symmetric weighting (Prelec 1998) in some cases, employing
weighting functions that have been used in both empirical and theoretical work on prospect
theory (Gonzalez and Wu 1999).
2
Section 3 contains several extensions of the model. First, we show that the introduction
of loss aversion  the systematically different treatment of gains and losses  implies that
gain and loss probabilities should also be perceived systematically different. We predict
violations of reflectivity in the direction of an optimism bias (Sharot et al. 2007). Second,
we illustrate that our results do not depend on the use of simple prospects. For more
complicated prospects, our model predicts behavior in line with rank-dependent models
(Quiggin 1982). Finally, in Section 4 we consider what might happen if eventually the value
function adapts optimally, now given the probability weighting function, and how one might
be trapped in a local optimum. We briefly discuss the issues of empirical testability of our
results.
In Friedman and Massaro (1998) a reason for overestimation of small and underestimation
of large probabilities is suggested which is very different from our argument. Agents cannot
perceive (or process) the true objective probability p ∈ [0, 1] but instead have to work with
pˆ ∈ [0, 1] which corresponds to the true probability p plus a noise term e. The signalling
process is such that if |p + e| > 1 then a new signal is drawn, and thus the expected value
of the true probability E(p|pˆ) is closer to 0.5 than the signal pˆ. This way of dealing with
probabilities is completely rational once the signal generating process is taken into account.
There are several other contributions that can be classified as belonging to the evolution-
ary second-best approach to behavior. They all share the property that some underlying
constraint induces one distortion, or behavioral anomaly, which in turn makes it optimal to
introduce another anomaly to partially compensate for the first. In Samuelson (2004) and
Noeldeke and Samuelson (2005), agents cannot correctly process information about their
environment, specifically about current earnings opportunities. Concern for relative con-
sumption then becomes a second-best optimal way of utilizing the information inherent in
others' consumption levels. Samuelson and Swinkels (2006) argue that choice-set dependency
might be an analogous way of correcting for an agent's lack of understanding of her choices'
fitness implications under different conditions. Finally, Baliga and Ely (2009) start from the
assumption of imperfect memory: after having made an investment, an agent forgets about
the details of the project. The initial, sunk investment now still contains information, and
relying on this information for future decisions on the project can be second-best, rather
than a sunk cost fallacy.
Before we present our model in detail, we want to address an obvious question: Why
would evolution introduce additional anomalies rather than remove the origin of the prob-
lem? First, it might not be able to do so because the underlying constraint cannot be
relaxed. For instance, a mutation with weaker cognitive constraints might exhaust too much
energy to still be competitive. Second, even if the original problem could be removed, it
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is possible that an evolutionary process gets stuck in a second-best. This has first been
shown by Waldman (1994). In his model, a first-best mutant will not be able to invade a
second-best population, because its optimal characteristics are diluted through the process
of sexual recombination.3 An additional argument is given by Ely (2009), who considers
a complex species that reproduces asexually and whose behavior is determined by many
different parameters simultaneously. Even though all mutations are possible, i.e. the prob-
ability of a mutation to the first-best parameter setting is strictly positive, the species can
remain second-best forever, provided that smaller improvements at only a few parameters
(kludges) are more likely and the species' complexity grows sufficiently fast, which makes
an immediate mutation to the first-best increasingly unlikely.
2 Probability Weighting for Simple Prospects
2.1 The Basic Model
Consider the following model. There is an agent who has a current level of fitness c ∈ R
(which could change over time), that serves as her reference point. That is, she evaluates
payoffs as gains and losses relative to c. In doing so, we assume that the agent makes use of
an S-shaped value function, which is denoted V : R→ R and depicted in the following figure.
Figure 1: The Value Function
Adaptation to the reference point is captured by the assumption that V (c) = 0. It is
convenient to write both gains and losses as positive numbers, and to decompose V into
two functions, one used to evaluate gains (vG) and one to evaluate losses (vL). Specifically,
we define vG : R+ → R+ by vG(x) = V (c + x) for all gains x > 0, and vL : R+ → R+ by
vL(y) = −V (c − y) for all losses y > 0. We assume that both vG and vL are differentiable,
strictly increasing and strictly concave, and we keep them fixed throughout this section.
3See Dobbs and Molho (1999) for a generalized version of the model by Waldman (1994).
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As outlined in the Introduction, earlier work has tried to derive the value function from
more basic principles, such as cognitive or perceptive constraints. Because the focus of this
paper is to illuminate the interplay between probability weighting and the value function, we
refrain from providing a foundation of the value function itself, but simply take it as given.
We would like to point out, however, that the arguments by Waldman (1994) and Ely (2009)
discussed earlier provide an additional justification for this approach, even when the value
function remains unsubstantiated. We return to this issue in Section 4.
We start by considering simple prospects. Such prospects consist of one possible gain of
size x > 0 which occurs with probability 0 < p < 1, and one possible loss of size y > 0 which
occurs with the opposite probability 1 − p. It turns out to be convenient to define such
prospects in terms of relative rather than absolute probabilities. Hence a simple prospect
is a tuple (q, x, y) from the set P = R3+, where q = p/(1 − p) is the relative probability of
a gain. We assume that gains and losses are measured in terms of biological fitness, which
facilitates the analysis.4 We can then define a fitness function F : P → R that assigns to
each prospect (q, x, y) ∈P its expected fitness
F (q, x, y) =
(
q
1 + q
)
x−
(
1
1 + q
)
y (1)
which, relying on the results by e.g. Robson (1996), we take as the relevant criterion for
evolutionary success.
The basic choice situation is as simple as possible: when the agent is faced with a
prospect, she has to decide whether to accept or reject it. Then, (q, x, y) should be accepted
if F (q, x, y) ≥ 0, or equivalently q ≥ y/x, so that it (weakly) increases expected fitness above
the current level. In a dynamic interpretation, c+x or c− y could become the new reference
point if the prospect has been accepted and the risk has realized. Let P+ = {(q, x, y) ∈
P|q ≥ y/x} be the set of prospects with weakly positive and P− = P\P+ of those with
negative expected fitness.
To start with the most general approach, let η :P → R+ be a weighting function that,
for any prospect (q, x, y) ∈ P, yields a subjective relative decision weight η(q, x, y). Thus,
given a prospect (q, x, y), the agent perceives the relative gain probability q as η(q, x, y).
Equivalently, the actual gain probability p = q/(1+q) is perceived as η(q, x, y)/(1+η(q, x, y)),
and the loss probability 1− p as 1/(1 + η(q, x, y)) accordingly. We will be interested in the
weighting function that maximizes expected fitness given the fixed value function, with the
second-best-idea in mind that evolution should have selected for agents whose anomalies
4Defining payoffs in terms of, say, consumption levels adds an additional layer and makes it necessary to
elaborate on the way consumption translates into fitness.
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optimally compensate one another. Denote the set of weighting functions evolution can
choose from by W ⊆ RP+ . Then, we can define a functional U : P × W → R that assigns
the subjective utility score
Uη(q, x, y) =
(
η(q, x, y)
1 + η(q, x, y)
)
vG(x)−
(
1
1 + η(q, x, y)
)
vL(y) (2)
to prospects, using perceived probabilities as given by η. The agent will accept prospect
(q, x, y) if and only if Uη(q, x, y) ≥ 0. This can be reformulated to η(q, x, y) ≥ vL(y)/vG(x),
which is directly comparable to the criterion for optimal choice q ≥ y/x. Given that the
value function distorts one side of the optimality condition, it becomes apparent that the
other side should be distorted as well.
We conclude the introduction of the model by specifying the way in which prospects are
offered to the agent by nature. We assume that nature randomly draws and offers to the
agent one prospect at a time, according to a probability distribution that can be described
by a strictly positive density h on P.5 The agent, endowed with a fixed weighting function
η, then evaluates the offered prospect according to Uη and decides whether to accept or to
reject. Let P+η = {(q, x, y) ∈ P|η(q, x, y) ≥ vL(y)/vG(x)} be the set of prospects that
the agent accepts, and P−η =P\P+η the set of rejected prospects. The optimal, expected
fitness maximizing weighting function is then determined by the following program:
max
η∈W
∫
P+η
F (q, x, y)h(q, x, y)d(q, x, y). (3)
Problem (3) has the following equivalent formulation (see Appendix A.1 for details):
min
η∈W
∫
(P−η ∩P+)∪(P+η ∩P−)
|F (q, x, y)|h(q, x, y)d(q, x, y), (4)
which prescribes the minimization of (non-negative) fitness lost due to rejection of positive
fitness prospects (from the set P−η ∩ P+) and acceptance of negative fitness prospects
(P+η ∩P−). Formulation (4) is convenient for the following reason. Suppose there exists
a weighting function η ∈ W for which the objective in (4) takes the value zero. Given that
h is strictly positive, this requires that P+η = P+, so that P−η ∩P+ = P+η ∩P− =
∅.6 Hence behavior under η is identical to expected fitness/utility maximization, i.e. η
5The assumption of a continuous distribution is not essential to our arguments. The full support assump-
tion makes sure that there is actually evolutionary pressure for optimal handling of all possible prospects.
6Strictly speaking, this must only be true except for measure-zero sets of prospects.
6
perfectly compensates for the value function. We say that the first-best is achievable in
this case. Otherwise, if the optimal value of (4) is strictly positive, the solution is in fact
only second-best, with observed behavior that systematically deviates from unconstrained
expected fitness maximization.
2.2 Payoff-dependent Weighting
As a benchmark, we first want to consider the possibility of unconstrained choice of η.
Let F = RP+ be the complete set of weighting functions, which includes functions where
perceived probabilities do not only depend on true probabilities but also on the size of the
associated gain and loss. We can then state the following immediate result.
Proposition 1. Suppose W = F . Then, the first-best is achievable.
There is actually a variety of different first-best weighting functions ηFB ∈ F . Consider
ηFB(q, x, y) = q · vL(y)
vG(x)
x
y
,
for instance, for which we obtain ηFB(q, x, y) ≥ vL(y)/vG(x)⇔ q ≥ y/x, so that actual and
fitness maximizing decisions coincide. We will not discuss this function in further detail,
as the behavior it induces cannot be distinguished from expected utility maximization with
correct probability perception and a linear Bernoulli utility function.7 One aspect, however,
is worth being pointed out: ηFB is linear in q for given x and y, so that there is no need to
systematically distort the relative perception of large and small probabilities when weighting
can condition on payoffs.
2.3 Separate Weighting
In prospect theory applied to simple prospects (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), probability
weighting is assumed to be independent of payoffs, i.e. perceived probabilities depend on true
probabilities but not on the size of gains and losses. The same holds true for expected utility
theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) where η(q, x, y) = q, in terms of our notation.
Results from neurobiology provide support for this assumption. In an fMRI study, Berns
et al. (2008) find behaviorally meaningful neural correlates of non-linear (inverse S-shape)
probability weighting. They show that the pattern of [brain] activation could be largely
7Taking up our remark in footnote 3, risk aversion with respect to consumption could be introduced in
this framework by defining prospects as lotteries over consumption and using a concave function that maps
consumption into fitness.
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dissociated into magnitude-sensitive and probability-sensitive regions (p. 2052), which they
explicitly interpret as evidence for the hypothesis that people process these two dimensions
separately (p. 2055).8 Hence let
F ′ = {η ∈ F |∃ η˜ ∈ RR++ |∀(q, x, y) ∈P, η(q, x, y) = η˜(q)}
be the set of relative weighting functions which are independent of payoffs, and write, with
slight abuse of notation, such functions as functions η(q) of q only. We will continue to
derive optimality conditions for η if choice is restricted to F ′. The relation of our findings
to prospect theory will be discussed in the next subsection.
First, we focus on the case without loss aversion. Formally, this means that the functions
vG and vL are identical, so that gains and losses are evaluated symmetrically. We denote this
common valuation function by v. The following proposition states the important property
of optimal weighting that the relative probability of the gain is undervalued if and only if
the gain is the more likely than the loss.
Proposition 2. Suppose W = F ′ and there is no loss aversion. Then, any solution η∗ to
(4) satisfies
η∗(q) T q ⇔ q S 1, (5)
for almost all q ∈ R+.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
To grasp an intuition for the result, suppose the agent perceives probabilities correctly
(η(q) = q). Assume nature offers a prospect (q, x, y) where y = qx, so that the prospect's
fitness is exactly zero. Will the agent accept or reject it? The condition for rejection becomes
qv(x) < v(qx) which, due to strict concavity of v, is equivalent to q < 1. Hence whenever a
zero fitness prospect has a small relative gain probability, it will be rejected when probabilities
are perceived correctly. The reason is that any such prospect must satisfy y < x, i.e. its gain
must be larger than its loss. But then the use of the concave function v implies that the
gain is undervalued relative to the loss, resulting in rejection. Monotonicity of v implies that
all negative fitness lotteries with q < 1 are also rejected, but the same still holds for some
positive fitness lotteries, by continuity of v. Put differently, when there is no probability
weighting, prospects (q, x, y) with q < 1 are subject to only one of the two possible types
8The only region that Berns et al. (2008) found activated by both payoffs and probabilities is an area
close to the anterior cingulate cortex, which they see as a prime candidate for the integration of magnitude
and probability information (p. 2055). See Fehr-Duda, Bruhin, Epper, and Schubert (2010) for an instance
of (partial) non-separability of payoffs and probabilities.
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of mistakes: rejection of prospects with strictly positive fitness. The analogous argument
applies to prospects with q > 1, where correct probability perception implies that only the
mistake of accepting a negative fitness prospect can occur. To counteract these mistakes, it
becomes optimal to overvalue small relative gain probabilities (η∗(q) > q if q < 1) and to
undervalue large relative gain probabilities (η∗(q) < q if q > 1).
Note that neither Proposition 2 nor the above intuition depend on the prior h. The exact
shape of the solution η∗ will generally depend on h, but the direction of probability weighting
given in (5) does not. Hence Proposition 2 does not rely on (unknown) details about the
environment in which evolution operated.
Can the first-best still be achieved if choice of η is restricted to F ′? And if so, what is
the first-best weighting function? We are able to answer these two questions as follows.
Proposition 3. Suppose W = F ′ and there is no loss aversion. Then, the first-best is
achievable if and only if v(z) = βzα for some β > 0 and 0 < α < 1. The corresponding
first-best weighting function is ηFB(q) = qα.
Proposition 3 is a special case of Proposition 4, which we present in Section 3.1 and prove
in Appendix A.5. Achieving the first-best requires to align actual and fitness-maximizing
behavior. Specifically, all fitness-neutral prospects (q, x, qx) must actually be identified as
such by the agent, so that, by monotonicity, all prospects with strictly positive fitness will be
accepted and those with strictly negative fitness will be rejected. The condition Uη(q, x, qx) =
0 can be reformulated to η(q) = v(qx)/v(x). This can only be solved by some η ∈ F ′ if the
ratio v(qx)/v(x) is independent of x, for all q. It can be shown that any continuous, strictly
increasing and concave function v which satisfies this property must be of the CRRA form
v(z) = βzα. Whenever the value function does not belong to this class (which should be
considered as the generic case), the fitness-maximizing solution η∗ is truly second-best. As
a consequence, the agent's behavior will deviate from expected fitness maximization, in the
direction predicted by prospect theory, as the next section will show.
2.4 Relation to Prospect Theory
We now want to examine how the above derived optimality conditions relate to the probabil-
ity weighting postulated in prospect theory. There, it is usually assumed (Prelec 1998) that
a function piG : [0, 1] → [0, 1] transforms the actual gain probability p into a perceived gain
decision weight piG(p), and a function piL : [0, 1] → [0, 1] likewise transforms the loss proba-
bility 1− p into piL(1− p). The term decision weights is used because piG(p) and piL(1− p)
do not necessarily sum up to one, and thus are not necessarily probabilities.
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The absolute weighting functions piG and piL relate to our relative weighting function η
as follows. On the one hand, any given pair (piG, piL) induces a unique η, i.e. when piG and
piL are employed, the relative gain probability q = p/(1− p) is perceived as
η(piG,piL)(q) =
piG(q/(1 + q))
piL(1/(1 + q))
.
The converse is not true, because there are different pairs of absolute weighting functions
(piG, piL) that implement a given relative perception η. That means there is not a unique way
of representing the optimal weighting η∗ in terms of prospect theory weighting functions,
except if we impose additional requirements on (piG, piL). Two candidates that have received
attention in both the theoretical and the empirical literature are the following (Prelec 1998):
1. Reflectivity. (piG, piL) is reflective if piG(r) = piL(r), ∀r ∈ [0, 1].
2. Symmetry. (piG, piL) is symmetric if pii(1− r) = 1− pii(r), ∀r ∈ [0, 1] and i = G,L.
Reflectivity requires the identical treatment of gain and loss probabilities. We will skip the
indices G and L when referring to reflective weighting functions. Reflective weighting is
especially appealing from an evolutionary perspective. It redundantizes the maintenance of
two separate weighting mechanisms, which would be resource expensive and could lead to
undesirable interference effects. Hence evolution should have settled on reflective weighting
if the optimal probability perception can be implemented in this way. Even if no reflective
probability weighting function implements our second-best solution, evolution may favor
a reflective probability weighting function if the savings in cognitive resources outweigh
the expected loss from suboptimal decisions. Symmetry is then also appealing because, if
imposed in addition to reflectivity, it ensures that pi(p) + pi(1− p) = pi(p) + 1− pi(p) = 1 for
all p ∈ [0, 1], i.e. that probabilities are in fact perceived as probabilities. Let us see whether
the optimal η∗ can be implemented by reflective weighting, and how property (5) then affects
the shape of the absolute weighting function.
Lemma 1. (i) A function η ∈ F ′ can be implemented by reflective weighting if and only if
η(1/q) = 1/η(q), ∀q ∈ R+. (6)
(ii) Suppose the optimal weighting function η∗ derived from program (4) satisfies (6). Then
any reflective piη∗ that implements η∗ satisfies
piη∗(p)
piη∗(1− p) T
p
1− p ⇔ p S
1
2
. (7)
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If symmetry is imposed in addition, piη∗ = η∗(p/(1− p))/(1 + η∗(p/(1− p))) is unique, with
piη∗(p) T p⇔ p S 1
2
. (8)
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Note that (7) corresponds to condition (5) in Proposition 2, and (8) corresponds to a
key property of probability weighting functions in prospect theory: small probabilities are
over-weighted and large probabilities are under-weighted.
Prelec (1998) summarizes empirical evidence on the shape of weighting functions, which
provides support for reflectivity. Our Lemma 1 identifies condition (6) as crucial for the
question whether or not the evolutionary optimal weighting can be implemented reflectively.
For instance, piFB(q) = qα presented in Proposition 3 satisfies (6). According to the lemma,
the unique reflective and symmetric weighting function that implements ηFB is then given
by
piηFB(p) =
pα
pα + (1− p)α . (9)
Function (9) has been studied in the context of probability weighting by Karmarkar (1978,
1979). In Figure 2, it is depicted by a solid line for the case when α = 1/2.
Figure 2: Common Weighting Functions.
While there exists empirical evidence on the reflectivity of actual probability weighting,
there is also much evidence on the asymmetry of weighting functions. Individuals tend to
overweigh absolute probabilities below approximately 1/3 and underweigh those above 1/3,
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in contrast to (8). Hence symmetry might not be a reasonable property to impose. Prelec
(1998) instead suggests and axiomatizes the following class of reflective but non-symmetric
functions:
pi(p) = e−[(− ln p)
α] where 0 < α < 1. (10)
We show in Appendix A.4 that this function indeed satisfies condition (7). This does, of
course, not yet imply that (10) is optimal. It only shows that the function suggested by Prelec
remains a candidate for optimal weighting, as it satisfies a necessary optimality condition.
In fact, the relative weighting implemented by function (10) is given by
η(q) =
e[ln(1+q)]
α
e[ln(1+q)−ln(q)]
α ,
which is similar but not identical to ηFB(q) = qα, so that (10) remains a candidate for actual
second-best weighting only. The dashed line in Figure 2 depicts (10), for the exponent 1/2.
3 Extensions
3.1 Loss Aversion
As a first extension, we want to allow for loss aversion, which means that the agent takes a
loss of given size more seriously than a gain of the same size. We formalize this as follows. We
assume that there exists a function v : R+ → R+ such that vG(z) = v(z) and vL(z) = γv(z)
for some γ ≥ 1. The parameter γ measures the degree of loss aversion. For γ = 1 we obtain
the special case already considered in Proposition 3, while loss aversion requires γ > 1. We
can then state the following generalization of Proposition 3.
Proposition 4. Suppose W = F ′ and γ ≥ 1. Then, the first-best is achievable if and only
if v(z) = βzα for some β > 0 and 0 < α < 1. The corresponding first-best weighting function
is ηFB(q) = γqα.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
There are two main insights that can be derived from Proposition 4. First, the fact
that the first-best can be achieved for special cases but not in general is unaffected by the
existence of loss aversion. The condition for attainability of the first-best is independent
of the size of γ. For the second main insight, consider the optimal ηFB(q) = γqα and its
implementation in terms of absolute weighting functions (piG, piL). Whenever γ > 1, we
have ηFB(1/q) = γ/qα 6= 1/γqα = 1/ηFB(q), so that (6) is violated and the optimum can no
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longer be implemented reflectively. In fact, both reflectivity and symmetry must be violated.
This is true in much greater generality, i.e. not only when the first-best is attainable, as the
following proposition shows.
Proposition 5. Suppose W = F ′ and γ > 1. Let η∗ be a solution to (4), and assume
(pi∗G, pi
∗
L) implements η∗. Then, (pi∗G, pi∗L) is neither reflective nor symmetric.
Proof. Let W = F ′, γ > 1, and suppose η∗ is a solution to (4). Arguing as in the proof of
Proposition 2, it then follows that η∗(q) > q for all q < γ. In particular, since γ > 1, we have
η∗(1) > 1. Assume (pi∗G, pi∗L) implements η∗, i.e. pi∗G(q/(1 + q))/pi∗L(1/(1 + q)) = η∗(q). For q = 1
we obtain pi∗G(1/2)/pi∗L(1/2) = η∗(1) > 1, and thus pi∗G(1/2) > pi∗L(1/2). Hence (pi∗G, pi∗L) is not
reflective. Furthermore, symmetry requires pii(1/2) = 1/2 for both i = G,L, so that (pi∗G, pi∗L) is also
not symmetric.
On a positive account, the model with loss aversion does actually provide a basis for
asymmetric weighting, in line with empirical findings. Yet, loss aversion also implies non-
reflectivity in our model which seems not supported by the empirical evidence. If there is
an asymmetry in the evaluation of gains and losses, the second-best principle calls for a sys-
tematically different treatment of gain and loss probabilities. Let us examine the properties
of this differential treatment more closely. Consider the solution ηFB(q) = γqα, for instance.
The following absolute weighting functions, called linear in log odds by Gonzalez and Wu
(1999), implement ηFB and additionally satisfy piFBG (p) + piFBL (1− p) = 1:
piFBG (p) =
γpα
γpα + (1− p)α , pi
FB
L (p) =
(1/γ)pα
(1/γ)pα + (1− p)α . (11)
They are illustrated in Figure 3 for the case of α = 1/2 and γ = 3/2.9 Importantly, the
function used to weight gain probabilities lies above the one for losses, which compensates
for the relative overassessment of losses implied by loss aversion. Hence our model predicts a
specific type of non-reflectivity, which is close to what has become known as overconfidence
(Camerer and Lovallo 1999) or, even more closely, optimism (Sharot et al. 2007). The fact
that loss aversion and optimism might optimally compensate for one another has also been
pointed out by Yao and Li (2009). They argue that investors who exhibit both anomalies will
be most successful, provided that information is sufficiently incomplete. From the perspective
of our model, this provides the basis for the following thought. We have already discussed the
evolutionary benefits of reflective probability weighting. Hence it might make sense to impose
reflectivity, captured by condition (6), as an additional constraint on evolution's optimization
9Several empirical studies have concluded that, to compensate for a loss of any given size, individuals
require a gain of roughly twice that size (see e.g. Fox et al. 2007). With the function v(z) = βzα, this
implies γ = 2α for the parameter of loss aversion, which we approximate by 3/2 for the case when α = 1/2.
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Figure 3: Non-reflective Weighting for α = 1/2 and γ = 3/2.
problem when there is loss aversion. The resulting third-best could then involve systematic
optimism as in Yao and Li (2009) as an additional compensating anomaly.
Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2007) study the evolution of general perception biases
in strategic settings, which includes biases such as overoptimism or overconfidence. In a
strategic setting, such biases may be evolutionary beneficial because they can change the
equilibrium structure. In Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), Bénabou and Tirole (2002) and
Brocas and Carrillo (2004), individuals may choose to adhere to delusions, because they
serve as commitment devices in the presence of time-inconsistency problems. Hence these
latter contributions are again closer to our approach, by modelling incorrect perceptions of
reality as a compensation for pre-existing biases (hyperbolic discounting in these models).
3.2 More General Prospects
In this subsection we want to investigate whether our results apply more generally than just
to simple prospects. The use of simple prospects made the analysis tractable and helped to
develop an intuition, but it poses the obvious question to what extent the previous results
are robust. Hence assume that a prospect consists of a vector of payoffs z ∈ Rn, where n ≥ 2
and z = (z1, ..., zn) with z1 < ... < zk < 0 < zk+1 < ... < zn for 1 ≤ k < n, so that there are k
possible losses and n− k possible gains. The associated probabilities are given by p ∈]0, 1[n,
where p = (p1, ..., pn) with
∑n
i=1 pi = 1. The model examined previously is included in this
setup as the special case where n = 2 and k = 1. As before, let P denote the set of all such
prospects (for fixed values of n and k, which are suppressed for notational convenience).
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The usual fitness mapping F : P → R is given by F (p, z) = p · z, where · represents
vector multiplication. The sets P+ and P− of positive and negative fitness lotteries are
then defined as before. Now let pi :P →]0, 1[n be a weighting function that assigns decision
weights pi(p, z) = (pi1(p, z), ..., pin(p, z)) to prospects, such that Upi(p, z) = pi(p, z) · V (z)
is the agent's perceived utility from prospect (p, z), where V (z) ∈ Rn denotes the vector
obtained by mapping z pointwise through the value function V . The assumptions imposed
on V and on h are identical to those described in Section 2.1. Based on the utility function
we immediately obtain the sets P+pi and P−pi of prospects that are accepted and rejected,
respectively, and the optimization problem we are interested in is given by
min
pi∈W
∫
(P−pi ∩P+)∪(P+pi∩P−)
|F (p, z)|h(p, z)d(p, z), (12)
for some strictly positive density h on P and a set of admissible weighting functions W .
Let F denote the unrestricted set of weighting functions, and F ′ the set of functions
which depend on p only. We can now prove the following result.
Proposition 6. (i) Suppose n > 2 and W = F . Then, the first-best is achievable.
(ii) Suppose n > 2 and W = F ′. Then, the first-best is not achievable.
Proof. Part (i). Let piFB(p, z) be given by piFBi (p, z) = pizi/V (zi), ∀i = 1, ..., n. Then we
have piFB(p, z) ·V (z) =∑ni=1 piFBi (p, z) ·V (zi) =∑ni=1 pizi = p ·z, so that utility and fitness
maximization becomes identical and the first-best is achieved.
Part (ii). Suppose n > 2 and W = F ′. Assume also that k ≥ 2 (the proof is analogous
when k = 1 but n−k ≥ 2), and let pi∗ ∈ F ′ be a solution to (12). Consider any (p, z1) such
that p · z1 = 0, and construct z2(²) from z1 by letting z21(²) = z11 − ², z22(²) = z12 + (p1/p2)²,
and z2i (²) = z1i for all i = 3, ..., n. Whenever ² ∈]², ²[, where ² ≡ p2(z11 − z12)/(p1 + p2) < 0
and ² ≡ min{p2(−z12)/p1, p2(z13 − z12)/p1} > 0, we have that z21(²) < z22(²) < min{z23(²), 0},
so that z2(²) is well-defined. Furthermore, p · z2(²) = 0 holds for all ². We now obtain
∂2 [pi∗(p) · V (z2(²))]
∂²2
= pi∗1(p)V
′′(z21(²)) + pi
∗
2(p)
(
p1
p2
)2
V ′′(z22(²)) > 0
due to strict convexity of V below zero, so that utility, as opposed to fitness, is not constant
in ² < ² < ². Continuity of V then implies that for (every) p there is a positive measure set
of payoffs z for which p · z and pi∗(p) · V (z) have the opposite sign, which implies that pi∗
is not first-best.
The fact that payoff-dependent weighting facilitates first-best behavior is unchanged by
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the introduction of more general prospects. A change occurs for payoff-independent weight-
ing: the first-best can never be achieved with more than only one gain and loss, not even
for specific value functions such as v(z) = βzα. It is thus important to keep in mind that all
our following results are about actual second-best weighting.
In general, the model becomes hard to tackle analytically for n > 2. Therefore, we
will proceed to present numerical results for several interesting cases of payoff-independent
weighting. Our numerical procedure is described in detail in Appendix A.6. All following
results are for the case of two gains and two losses (n = 4, k = 2). We use vG(z) = zα and
vL(z) = γz
α for the value function, and assume that nature offers prospects according to
a uniform prior.10 For each combination of α ∈ {1, 3/4, 1/2, 1/4, 1/10} and γ ∈ {1, 3/2},
we search for the optimal weighting function within the rank-dependent framework (Quiggin
1982). There, the additional restriction is imposed that there exists a (bijective) function
w : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] which transforms cumulated probabilities. Formally,
pii(p) = w
(
i∑
j=1
pi
)
− w
(
i−1∑
j=1
pi
)
. (13)
As a result, the obtained decision weights pii are in fact probabilities because they sum up to
one. Cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) uses a similar formulation,
where an inverse of cumulated probabilities is transformed for gains.
Karmarkar γ = 1 γ = 3/2
α β∗ Fitness β∗ Fitness
1 1.0000 0.2714 1.3819 0.2646
3/4 0.7708 0.2713 1.2222 0.2612
1/2 0.5208 0.2707 1.2847 0.2555
1/4 0.2639 0.2690 1.2847 0.2467
1/10 0.1042 0.2672 1.1111 0.2433
Table 1: Results for w(p) = pβ/(pβ + (1− p)β).
Table 1 contains the results when we parameterize w(p) = pβ/(pβ + (1 − p)β) as in
Karmarkar (1978, 1979), and search the range β ∈ [0, 2] so that linear, S-shape, and inverse
S-shape weighting is admitted. The first main column refers to the case without loss aversion
(γ = 1). If we additionally assume that payoffs are perceived linearly (α = 1), the optimum
does not involve any probability weighting (β∗ = 1). The corresponding behavior is first-
10Our results appear to be robust to the use of different priors. Appendix A.6 contains all results of this
section for a different prior, where payoffs and probabilities are not independent.
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best, yielding the largest possible fitness level (0.2714). We now introduce S-shaped payoff
valuation by decreasing α towards zero. As Table 1 shows, the optimal exponent of the
weighting function does then also go to zero, which means that probability weighting should
become increasingly inverse S-shaped, as in our simpler model in Section 2. It is even true
that the optimal exponent β∗ of probability weighting is almost equal to the exponent α of the
value function, which we identified as a property of first-best weighting for simple prospects
in Proposition 3. Note again, however, that the first-best can no longer be achieved in the
present setup when α < 1. As can be seen from Table 1, the optimal fitness level goes
down (albeit not too much) as we decrease α, i.e. as we increase the severity of the original
distortion.
With loss aversion (γ = 3/2), the picture looks different. According to the results in
Table 1, optimal weighting should now be S-shaped (β∗ > 1), in contrast to both our
previous findings and empirical evidence. Before taking this result serious, though, we need
to point out that it holds for imposed reflectivity and symmetry, while the model with
simple prospects implied that both these properties are violated in an unrestricted optimum
under loss aversion (Proposition 5). Let us therefore relax the assumption of symmetry, by
considering the more general linear in log odds function w(p) = δpβ/(δpβ + (1 − p)β), for
values β, δ ∈ [0, 2].
LLO γ = 1 γ = 3/2
α β∗ δ∗ Fitness β∗ δ∗ Fitness
1 1.0000 1.0000 0.2714 1.0069 0.6944 0.2713
3/4 0.7708 1.0000 0.2713 0.7708 0.6875 0.2712
1/2 0.5208 1.0000 0.2707 0.5208 0.6806 0.2705
1/4 0.2639 1.0000 0.2690 0.2569 0.6736 0.2688
1/10 0.1042 1.0000 0.2672 0.1042 0.6667 0.2669
Table 2: Results for w(p) = δpβ/(δpβ + (1− p)β).
Without loss aversion, the optimum is again achieved by symmetric weighting (δ∗ = 1),
so that column 1 in Table 2 is otherwise identical to Table 1. A crucial difference arises
under loss aversion: allowing for asymmetry restores the inverse S-shape of the weighting
function. Also, the emerging asymmetry is strikingly close to empirical findings, with the
point of correct probability perception strictly below 1/2. For the case where α = 1/2 and
γ = 3/2, the optimally adjusted linear in log odds function is depicted as a solid line in
Figure 4. Picking up on our remarks in Section 3.1, we believe this finding provides support
for the idea of treating reflectivity (but not symmetry) as an additional constraint on the
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fitness maximization problem. If gain and loss probabilities have to be treated identically, for
instance due to large fixed costs of a weighting mechanism, loss aversion implies a systematic
deviation from symmetry, in the direction found in many empirical studies.
Figure 4: Numerical results for α = 1/2 and γ = 3/2.
The last functional form we consider is Prelec's (1998) generalized function w(p) =
e−δ(− ln p)
β . Table 3 reveals that optimal weighting is again inverse S-shaped, with a strong
correlation between the inverse S-shape of the weighting function (as captured by β∗) and
the S-shape of the value function (as captured by α). For δ = 1, the Prelec function is not
symmetric whenever α < 1. When there is no loss aversion (column 1 in Table 3), this is
compensated by letting δ∗ < 1, so that the optimal function is at least close to symmet-
ric. With loss aversion, symmetry is again violated systematically. The generalized Prelec
function which is optimal for α = 1/2 and γ = 3/2 is depicted by a dotted line in Figure 4.
Prelec γ = 1 γ = 3/2
α β∗ δ∗ Fitness β∗ δ∗ Fitness
1 1.0000 1.0000 0.2714 0.9306 1.2431 0.2713
3/4 0.7708 0.9306 0.2713 0.7014 1.1597 0.2712
1/2 0.5347 0.8542 0.2706 0.4931 1.0903 0.2705
1/4 0.2708 0.7708 0.2688 0.2569 1.0069 0.2688
1/10 0.1111 0.7222 0.2668 0.1042 0.9514 0.2669
Table 3: Results for w(p) = e−δ(− ln p)β .
To resolve doubts that our findings might still depend on the functional forms chosen, we
18
conducted a non-parameterized grid-search for the optimal weighting function w(p) within
the rank-dependent framework. The result, contained in Appendix A.6, again confirms that
optimal weighting exhibits an inverse S-shape with overweighting of small and underweight-
ing of large probabilities.
4 Discussion
The main insight of our analysis is that non-linear probability weighting is a complement
of non-linear payoff valuation. As a consequence, probability weighting should be more
pronounced for agents whose value function deviates more strongly from linearity. This can
be seen most easily for the case of first-best weighting, where the exponent of the optimal
linear in log odds function is equal to the value function's exponent, and it has further
been illustrated in the previous Section 3.2. We now want to outline how that insight could
become the basis for empirical testing. In fact, our theory has to be augmented by additional
hypotheses before the above described correlation translates into a testable prediction. The
following two obstacles need to be addressed:
1. Mutual optimality. We have derived optimal weighting for given value functions. How-
ever, long-run evolutionary stability would probably also require inverse optimality of
the value function for the given weighting function.
2. Polymorphic populations. When there are different, mutually optimal value-weighting-
function pairs, it is not evident that evolution would support a polymorphic equilibrium
in which several of them are present.
Concerning mutual optimality, observe first that it follows immediately for all the cases
where the first-best is achievable. When simple prospects are concerned and probabilities are
weighted by pi(p) = pα/(pα+ (1− p)α) for some α, then v(z) = zα is indeed optimal because
the best possible fitness level is attained. Although this result is not yet entirely satisfactory,
it at least serves as an illustration that different, mutually optimal pairs of weighting and
value functions can indeed exist.
The problem with polymorphic populations is twofold. First, coexistence of different
types in a model with multiple traits either requires that reproduction is asexual (as in Ely
2009), or that probability weighting function and value function are inherited jointly, since
otherwise genetic recombination systematically yields mismatches (Waldman 1994). Alterna-
tively, the problem could be overcome by assortativity within a heterogeneous population.11
11We are greatful to Joel Sobel for pointing out this possibility.
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Second, and more importantly, coexistence of different value-weighting-function pairs would
require them to achieve exactly the same fitness level, while our results in Section 3.2 indi-
cate that fitness goes down as the value function's S-shape becomes more pronounced, even
with optimally adapted weighting function. On the other hand, this decline is small: in
Table 2, for instance, the fitness level achievable with a value function exponent of α = 1/4
is still more than 99% of the first-best fitness, with and without loss-aversion. Hence an
appropriately defined evolutionary ²-equilibrium could easily comprise heterogeneity.
We want to conclude the discussion by proposing a unifying hypothesis that deals with
both mutual optimality and heterogeneity jointly. Suppose most decisions our evolutionary
ancestors had to make were in fact as simple as modelled in Section 2, for instance because the
outcome of a hunt can be classified as either a success or a failure. Then, mutual optimality
of pi(p) = pα/(pα + (1 − p)α) and v(z) = zα is immediate for any α, as argued above.
Also, any such combination yields the identical first-best fitness level, enabling polymorphic
equilibria in a suitably defined population model. Still, in the presumably more complicated
modern world (or in specifically designed experiments), to which adaptation has not occurred,
behavioral differences would emerge between individuals.
We are not aware of a study that either explicitly examines the correlation between value
and weighting function curvatures, or provides enough individual-level estimation results to
make meaningful correlation statements. Gonzalez and Wu (1999) present estimated pa-
rameters for only 10 subjects, Hsu et al. (2009) for only 16 subjects.12 Qiu and Steiger
(2010) estimate value and weighting functions for 124 subjects, and conclude that there is
no positive correlation. Their measure of the probability weighting function is, however, the
relative area below the function, which captures elevation rather than curvature.13 More
helpful for our purpose is the contribution by Bruhin et al. (2010). Based on experimental
data for altogether 448 subjects, they estimate a finite mixture model in which individuals
12Gonzalez and Wu (1999) consider gain lotteries only, and perform nonparametric estimates of individual
value and weighting functions. Then they show that the nonparametric results can be approximated by the
CRRA value function and the linear in log odds weighting function. Using their estimates (Table 3, p. 157),
we obtain a value of −0.05 for the coefficient of correlation between the estimated exponents of the value and
the weighting function. Statements about significance are not straightforward because the parameters are
themselves only estimated. When treating them as a standard sample, however, this result is not significantly
different from zero at any reasonable level. Hsu et al. (2009) are mostly interested in the neural correlates
of probability weighting, but also present estimated parameters from a behavioral experiment. They also
consider gain lotteries only, and fit a CRRA value function together with the one parameter Prelec function
(10). Based on their estimates (Table S4, p. 13 online supplementary material), we obtain a coefficient of
correlation of +0.04, which is again insignificant.
13Qiu and Steiger (2010) also estimate a linear in log odds function, but they provide a (nonsignificant)
coefficient of correlation only between the exponent α of CRRA utility and the parameter δ of the weighting
function, rather than the exponent β, in which we would be interested. Note that Qiu and Steiger (2010)
consider only gains (no losses are possible), and the weighting functions they estimate are mostly not inverse
S-shaped but convex.
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are endogenously grouped into different behavioral categories. They find that (only) two
such categories emerge: 20% of all individuals maximize expected payoffs, using linear value
and probability weighting functions, while 80% exhibit inverse S-shape probability weight-
ing. From our perspective, these types could correspond to two different points from the
continuum of second-best possibilities. However, Bruhin et al. (2010) also find that the value
function of the group that weighs probabilities non-linearly is concave for gains but not con-
vex for losses (Table 5, p. 25). This finding is at odds with standard prospect theory and,
since our basic premise of an S-shaped value function is not satisfied, makes it impossible to
directly test our model.
5 Conclusions
Substantial progress has been made in the theory of bounded rationality during the last
decades. There is, however, still widespread unease about relaxing the assumption of ratio-
nality, often based on the argument that behavioral economics offers many different expla-
nations for different phenomena, but not a unifying model. For instance, Rubinstein (1998)
describes a view according to which ...rationality of the decision maker can be seen as the
minimal discipline to be imposed on the modeler [emphasis added]. Our departure from the
rational man paradigm represents a removal of those chains. However, there are an infinite
number of plausible models that can explain social phenomena; without such chains we
are left with a strong sense of arbitrariness (p. 4).
In this paper, we have shown that two specific model ingredients  adaptive S-shaped
payoff valuation and probability misperception  are in fact not arbitrary but complement
each other in achieving a second-best. The underlying idea is more general: behavioral
anomalies should not be examined in isolation, but must be understood as an interacting
system. Once cognitive constraints introduce an anomaly, we should expect deviations from
perfectly rational behavior elsewhere, too. This idea is not a unifying theory, but it might
provide a generalized framework for thinking about bounded rationality. Models based on the
evolutionary second-best approach are able to make predictions about the co-occurrence or
mutual exclusion of behavioral anomalies, and as such could help to organize the multiplicity
of empirically documented behavioral phenomena.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Transformed Objective
The objective from (3) can be rewritten as∫
P+η ∩P+
F (q, x, y)h(q, x, y)d(q, x, y) +
∫
P+η ∩P−
F (q, x, y)h(q, x, y)d(q, x, y)
because P+ and P− form a partition of P. This in turn is equivalent to∫
P+η ∩P+
F (q, x, y)h(q, x, y)d(q, x, y) +
∫
P+η ∩P−
F (q, x, y)h(q, x, y)d(q, x, y)
+
∫
P−η ∩P+
F (q, x, y)h(q, x, y)d(q, x, y)−
∫
P−η ∩P+
F (q, x, y)h(q, x, y)d(q, x, y),
where the same term has been added and subtracted. Since P+η and P−η also form a partition of
P, we can rearrange to∫
P+
F (q, x, y)h(q, x, y)d(q, x, y)
−
 ∫
P−η ∩P+
F (q, x, y)h(q, x, y)d(q, x, y)−
∫
P+η ∩P−
F (q, x, y)h(q, x, y)d(q, x, y)
 .
Since the first term in this expression is independent of η, we can equivalently minimize the expres-
sion in brackets. Observing that F (q, x, y) ≥ 0 for all (q, x, y) ∈ P−η ∩P+ and F (q, x, y) < 0 for
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all (q, x, y) ∈P+η ∩P−, this immediately yields the transformed problem (4).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We first rewrite problem (4) for the present case. We write v for the identical functions vG and vL,
and we use the fact that W = F ′. Then, for any q ∈ R+, define X +(q) = {(x, y) ∈ R2+|q ≥ y/x}
and X −(q) = {(x, y) ∈ R2+|q < y/x}. For any r ∈ R+ let V +(r) = {(x, y) ∈ R2+|r ≥ v(y)/v(x)}
and V −(r) = {(x, y) ∈ R2+|r < v(y)/v(x)}. Then, we can reformulate (4) as follows:
min
η∈F ′
∫
R+
 ∫
(V −(η(q))∩X +(q))∪(V +(η(q))∩X −(q))
|F (q, x, y)|h(q, x, y)d(x, y)
 dq. (14)
For any fixed value of q, the inner integral in (14) is affected by the function η only through V +(η(q))
and V −(η(q)), where in turn only the function value η(q) is relevant. Hence η∗ ∈ F ′ is a solution
to (14) if and only if
η∗(q) ∈ arg min
r∈R+
∫
V −(r)∩X +(q)
|F (q, x, y)|h(q, x, y)d(x, y) +
∫
V +(r)∩X −(q)
|F (q, x, y)|h(q, x, y)d(x, y)
(15)
for almost all q ∈ R+. Denote the first integral in (15) by Λ1(q, r), the second by Λ2(q, r), and
let Λ(q, r) = Λ1(q, r)+Λ2(q, r), so that η∗(q) ∈ argmaxr∈R+ Λ(q, r) must hold for almost all q ∈ R+.
Fix any q < 1. We prove the following preliminary claim.
Lemma 2. Given any q < 1, Λ2(q, r) = 0 if r ≤ q.
Proof. If r ≤ q holds, any (x, y) ∈ V +(r) satisfies
v(y)
v(x)
≤ r ≤ q < 1,
where the first inequality follows from the definition of V +(r). Hence v(y) < v(x) and thus y < x,
so that strict concavity of v (together with v(0) = 0) implies
y
x
<
v(y)
v(x)
for all (x, y) ∈ V +(r). But then y/x < q, which implies (x, y) /∈X −(q). Hence V +(r)∩X −(q) = ∅,
so that Λ2(q, r) = 0.
Hence the mistake of accepting a negative fitness prospect does not occur for q < 1 when
η(q) ≤ q. Now consider the other type of mistake. V −(r) contains all payoffs (x, y) for which
r < v(y)/v(x). Hence V −(r) and therefore V −(r) ∩X +(q) is weakly shrinking (in the sense of set
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inclusion) in r, so that Λ1(q, r) is weakly decreasing in r. Combined with Lemma 2 this implies
that, whenever q < 1, Λ(q, r) is weakly decreasing in r up to and including q.
We complete the proof for q < 1 by showing that Λ(q, r) is strictly decreasing in r at r = q,
which implies that any solution η∗ must satisfy η∗(q) > q. Let r = q + ², for ² ≥ 0 with ² < 1− q.
Then, any (x, y) ∈ (V +(q + ²) ∩X −(q)) must satisfy
y ∈ ]qx, (q + ²)x[ ,
where the lower bound follows from the definition of X −(q). To derive the upper bound, note that
(x, y) ∈ V +(q+ ²) implies v(y)/v(x) ≤ q+ ² < 1, which implies y < x and hence y/x < v(y)/v(x) ≤
q + ² by concavity of v. Hence we have
Λ2(q, q + ²) ≤
∫
R+
 (q+²)x∫
qx
|F (q, x, y)|h(q, x, y)dy
 dx ≡ Λ˜2(q, ²), (16)
i.e. Λ˜2(q, ²) is an upper bound for Λ2(q, q + ²). Also, it holds that
∂Λ˜2(q, ²)
∂²
=
∫
R+
x|F (q, x, (q + ²)x)|h(q, x, (q + ²)x) dx.
Then ∂Λ˜2(q, 0)/∂² = 0 because F (q, x, qx) = 0. Observe that Λ˜2(q, 0) = 0, and Λ2(q, q + 0) = 0
by Lemma 2, so that Λ˜2(q, ²) and Λ2(q, q + ²) coincide for ² = 0. Altogether, this implies that
∂Λ2(q, q+ ²)/∂² = 0 at ² = 0 must also hold. Now consider Λ1(q, q+ ²). A tuple (x, y) is an element
of V −(q + ²) ∩X +(q) if and only if
y ∈ ]v−1 [(q + ²)v(x)] , qx] ,
where v−1 is the inverse of v, and v−1 [(q + ²)v(x)] < qx for sufficiently small ² due to concavity of
v and q < 1. Hence
Λ1(q, q + ²) =
∫
R+
 qx∫
v−1[(q+²)v(x)]
|F (q, x, y)|h(q, x, y)dy
 dx
such that
∂Λ1(q, q + ²)
∂²
=
−
∫
R+
(
v(x)
v′ [v−1 [(q + ²)v(x)]]
)
|F (q, x, v−1 [(q + ²)v(x)])|h(q, x, v−1 [(q + ²)v(x)]) dx.
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From the fact that v−1 [qv(x)] < qx it then immediately follows that ∂Λ1(q, q + ²)/∂² < 0 at ² = 0.
Hence we have
∂Λ(q, q + ²)
∂²
∣∣∣∣
²=0
=
∂Λ1(q, q + ²)
∂²
∣∣∣∣
²=0
+
∂Λ2(q, q + ²)
∂²
∣∣∣∣
²=0
< 0,
which completes the proof for q < 1.
The arguments for q = 1 and q > 1 are analogous and therefore omitted.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Part (i). Suppose η ∈ F ′ satisfies (6) and consider the reflective candidate piη(p) = η(p/(1−p))/(1+
η(p/(1− p))). It implements the relative perception
piη
(
q
1+q
)
piη
(
1
1+q
) = η
(
q
1+q × 1+q1
)
1 + η
(
q
1+q × 1+q1
) × 1 + η
(
1
1+q × 1+qq
)
η
(
1
1+q × 1+qq
) = η(q)
1 + η(q)
1 + η(1/q)
η(1/q)
.
Using (6) we obtain
η(q)
1 + η(q)
1 + η(1/q)
η(1/q)
=
η(q)2
1 + η(q)
[
η(q) + 1
η(q)
]
= η(q),
which shows that piη indeed implements η. For the converse, suppose η is implemented by some
reflective weighting pi, i.e. η(q) = pi(q/(1 + q)/pi(1/(1 + q)) for all q ∈ R+. Then we have
η(1/q) =
pi
(
1/q
1+1/q
)
pi
(
1
1+1/q
) = pi
(
1
1+q
)
pi
(
q
1+q
) = 1/η(q)
for all q ∈ R+, so η satisfies (6).
Part (ii). Suppose η∗ satisfies (6) and is implemented by reflective weighting piη∗ Then we have by
Proposition 2 that
piη∗(q/(1 + q))
piη∗(1/(1 + q))
T q ⇔ q S 1.
Substituting q = p/(1− p) then immediately yields condition (7). Also, the substitution shows that
η∗(p/(1− p)) = piη∗(p)
piη∗(1− p) .
Imposing symmetry piη∗(1 − p) = 1 − piη∗(p) and rearranging yields the unique solution piη∗(p) =
η∗(p/(1− p))/(1 + η∗(p/(1− p))), and straightforward calculations reveal that it satisfies (8).
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A.4 Proof that (10) satisfies condition (7)
Substituting pi(p) = e−[(− ln p)α] into
pi(p)
pi(1− p) T
p
1− p (17)
and rearranging leads to(
ln
(
1
1− p
))α
− ln
(
1
1− p
)
+ ln
(
1
p
)
−
(
ln
(
1
p
))α
T 0. (18)
Let fα(p) denote the left hand side of (18). Note that fα(12) = 0. Hence it is sufficient to show that
fα(p) falls strictly in p, or that f ′α(p) < 0 for 0 < α < 1. Consider
f ′α(p) = α
(
(− ln (1− p))α−1
1− p +
(− ln (p))α−1
p
)
− 1
1− p −
1
p
. (19)
The value of the derivative is strictly increasing in α and for α = 1 is is exactly 0. Hence it must
be strictly negative for α < 1, what completes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
We prove the proposition by two consecutive lemmas.
Lemma 3. Suppose W = F ′ and γ ≥ 1. Then, the first-best can be achieved if and only if there
exists a function δ : R+ → R+ such that
γv(qz)
v(z)
= δ(q) (20)
for all z ∈ R+.
Proof. Suppose the first-best is achievable by some function ηFB. Problem (4) can again be re-
formulated to (15), with the only difference that now V +(r) = {(x, y) ∈ R2+|r ≥ γv(y)/v(x)} and
V −(r) = {(x, y) ∈ R2+|r < γv(y)/v(x)}. The solution being first-best implies that Λ(q, ηFB(q)) = 0
holds for almost all q ∈ R+. This is equivalent to saying that, for almost all q, V −(ηFB(q))∩X +(q)
and V +(ηFB(q))∩X −(q) are measure-zero sets. Fix some value q ∈ R+. The line y = qx separates
the positive quadrant R2+ into X +(q) and X −(q). The curve y = v−1
[
ηFB(q)v(x)/γ
]
separates
R2+ into V +(ηFB(q)) and V −(ηFB(q)). Thus for almost all q ∈ R+, v−1
[
ηFB(q)v(x)/γ
]
= qx holds
for almost all x ∈ R+, and hence for all x ∈ R+ by continuity of v. Equivalently, for almost all
q ∈ R+,
γv(qx)
v(x)
= ηFB(q), ∀x ∈ R+, (21)
holds. Continuity of v then implies that there exists a function δ : R+ → R+, which coincides with
ηFB except possibly at countably many points, which satisfies (20).
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Conversely, if a function δ exists which satisfies (20), then ηFB = δ is a solution which achieves
the first-best, from the same arguments.
Lemma 4. The following two statements are equivalent.
(i) v : R+ → R+ is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies (20).
(ii) v : R+ → R+ is given by v(z) = βzα for some β > 0 and 0 < α < 1.
Proof. (ii)⇒ (i). This implication is obvious, with δ(q) = γqα being the function required in (20).
(i) ⇒ (ii). Suppose v satisfies (i). Define f : R+ → R+ by f(z) = v(z)/v(1). Clearly, f still
satisfies (i). Specifically, the function δ˜(z) ≡ δ(z)/γ satisfies f(qz) = δ˜(q)f(z) for all z, q ∈ R+.
Setting z = 1 we obtain f(q) = δ˜(q), for all q ∈ R+. Multiplication of both sides by f(z) then
yields that f(q)f(z) = δ˜(q)f(z) for all q, z ∈ R+. But since δ˜(q)f(z) = f(qz) from above, we obtain
that f(q)f(z) = f(qz) for all q, z ∈ R+, i.e. the function f is totally multiplicative. Since it is also
continuous and strictly increasing, it follows that f must be of the form f(z) = zα for some α > 0
(see Cohen (1989), p. 513). Since f is strictly concave, α < 1 must also hold. Then, v(z) = v(1)f(z)
implies that v(z) = βzα for some β > 0 and 0 < α < 1.
Lemmas 3 and 4 together imply that, when W = F ′, the first-best can be achieved if and only if
the function v (which is continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave) is given by v(z) = βzα
for some β > 0 and 0 < α < 1. The fact that ηFB(q) = γqα is a first-best solution then follows
immediately from the proof of Lemma 3.
A.6 Numerical Procedure
All numerical calculations were performed in GNU Octave. The scripts are available upon request.
Throughout, we consider the case with two losses and two gains. We start with defining a
finite version of the set of prospects P. First, we discretize the interval [0, 1] of probabilities into
a grid of size np, i.e. we allow for probabilities 0, 1/np, 2/np, ..., 1. We can then generate the set
of all probability vectors p = (p1, p2, p3, p4) based on this grid. Analogously, we allow for payoffs
between −k and +k and discretize [−k, k] into a grid of size nz, so that the set of all payoff vectors
z = (z1, z2, z3, z4) as defined in Section 3.2 can be derived for that grid. The set P of all prospects
is then made up of all possible combinations of probabilities and payoffs, and nature's prior is an
assignment of probabilities to each of these prospects. We use np = nz = 10 and k = 2, except if
stated otherwise.
The value function is given by vG(z) = zα and vL(z) = γzα, and we repeat the following
procedure for each combination of α ∈ {1, 3/4, 1/2, 1/4, 1/10} and γ ∈ {1, 3/2}. For any of the
considered weighting functions (Karmarkar, linear in log odds, Prelec), we search the range [0, 2] for
the optimal parameter values, i.e. the values of the weighting functions' parameters that maximize
expected fitness. The search is carried out in two stages. First, we decompose [0, 2] into a grid of
size ng and identify the optimum on that grid. As a second step, we search the area around this
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optimum (±1/ng) more closely, by again decomposing it into a grid of size ng. We use ng = 12
throughout.
For the nonparametric approach, we go through all increasing functions {0, 1/np, 2/np, ..., 1} →
{0, 1/np, 2/np, ..., 1}, calculate the associated fitness and identify the optimum. We have used
np = 12 here. For α = 1/2 and γ = 1, the result is displayed in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Nonparametric Result
All results in Section 3.2 are based on a uniform prior, where all prospects fromP are weighted
equally. As a robustness check, we have performed the same calculations for a different prior.
Specifically, we consider the case where the likelihood of a prospect (p, z) is inversely related to
its absolute fitness value |p · z|.14 On the one hand this captures a realistic scenario where more
extreme prospects are less common than more moderate prospects. On the other hand, probabilities
and payoffs are no longer statistically independent with this prior, unlike for the uniform case. The
corresponding results (Tables 4 to 6) appear below in the same order as Tables 1 to 3 in Section
3.2. It can be seen that there are only very small, if any, differences in the optimal parameters.
14Formally, the probability that nature offers a prospect (p, z) is assumed to be directly proportional to
1/(|p · z|+ 0.05), where 0.05 is added to deal with zero fitness prospects.
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Karmarkar γ = 1 γ = 3/2
α β∗ Fitness β∗ Fitness
1 1.0000 0.1226 1.4097 0.1108
3/4 0.7708 0.1222 1.3403 0.1074
1/2 0.5208 0.1207 1.3611 0.1025
1/4 0.2639 0.1178 1.2569 0.0970
1/10 0.1042 0.1157 1.1042 0.0953
Table 4: w(p) = pβ/(pβ + (1− p)β), nonuniform prior.
LLO γ = 1 γ = 3/2
α β∗ δ∗ Fitness β∗ δ∗ Fitness
1 1.0000 1.0000 0.1226 1.0069 0.6944 0.1223
3/4 0.7708 1.0000 0.1222 0.7708 0.6875 0.1218
1/2 0.5208 1.0000 0.1207 0.5139 0.6806 0.1202
1/4 0.2639 1.0000 0.1178 0.2569 0.6736 0.1174
1/10 0.1042 1.0000 0.1157 0.1042 0.6667 0.1152
Table 5: w(p) = δpβ/(δpβ + (1− p)β), nonuniform prior.
Prelec γ = 1 γ = 3/2
α β∗ δ∗ Fitness β∗ δ∗ Fitness
1 1.0000 1.0000 0.1226 0.9306 1.2431 0.1222
3/4 0.7708 0.9306 0.1221 0.7014 1.1667 0.1218
1/2 0.5278 0.8542 0.1203 0.4931 1.0903 0.1202
1/4 0.2708 0.7708 0.1174 0.2569 1.0069 0.1174
1/10 0.1111 0.7222 0.1150 0.1042 0.9514 0.1152
Table 6: w(p) = e−δ(− ln p)β , nonuniform prior.
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